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Targeting Enemy Merchant
Shipping:
An Overview of Law & Practice
I. Introduction

T

he title of this paper is, perhaps, very ambitious, but its object is to review
the impact of two inventions, centuries in gestation, which were brought
to birth through the inventive genius of Americans-Orville and Wilbur Wright
and their aircraft and John Phillip Holland and his submersible torpedo boat. (A
necessary adjunct to the latter was the earlier invention of the "Whitehead
torpedo.") There seems to be an almost fatal irony in noting that Holland
developed his boat, the principles of which remained controlling in building
such submersibles until the end ofWorld War II, as a member of the Irish Fenian
Brotherhood. His object: the humiliation of the British Navy through maritime,
clandestine guerrilla attacks. His goal was almost achieved in World War I by
boats built upon his principles but navigated, not by the Fenian Brotherhood,
but in open and declared warfare by Britain's foremost naval rival, the Imperial
German Navy.
In World War II a more refined German version, still designed on Holland's
basic principles, posed such a great threat that Winston Churchill claimed:
The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-Boat
peril ... I was even more anxious about this battle than I had been about the
glorious air fight called the Battle of Britain. 1

In World War II both the United States and the United Kingdom employed
submarines to challenge their enemies' surface supremacy in areas where they
were not able at the time to resort to the power of their surface units.
To the end of World War II, however, the vessels utilized in submarine
warfare were still submersible torpedo boats rather than true submarines. This
situation was not to last as, even before the end of World War II, the German
Navy was experimenting with the hydrogen peroxide fueled "Walther boat."
This vessel was of a revolutionary design, which provided fresh air for the crew
by means of the Dutch-designed "snorkel" and dispensed altogether with the
need for an oxygen breathing engine of the older "Holland"-style boats. The
Holland boats were obliged to motor on the surface in order to gain the speed
necessary to take up tactical fighting positions as well as to charge their batteries
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which stored the energy that drove the electric motors essential for submerged
navigation. By contrast, the Walther boat could travel submerged indefinitely,
and did not require the power plant duality of the traditional Holland boats.
Fortunately for the Allies, this style vessel was not operational during W orId War
II. Presendy, with the advent of nuclear powered boats, the age of the true
submarine has come into being. Such a warship can cruise submerged continuously; it is capable of travelling at very high speeds under water and does not
need to surface to fight or to launch its missiles.
In W orId War II, the air services also presented their challenge to surface
naval power and proved, after the Batde of Midway at the latest, to be surface
warfare's master. Debate now rages as to whether the air or the submarine
services will ultimately prove to hold the final keys to admiralty. Because of their
physical limitations, neither a maritime warplane nor a raiding submarine, can
comply with the values Nelson expressed in his prayer before the Batde of
Trafalgar: " ... may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the
British fleet." 2 Should a contest for mastery of the oceans come about under
contemporary conditions, it would be awesome in its magnitude, and in its dire
power would test men's hardihood and fortitude, their planning and their fighting
skills. The imminent and horrifying means of destruction may also challenge their
humanity. These animadversions, while taking our imaginations beyond the limit
ofthis paper, help to set a larger frame and one, moreover, within which the present
topic must need be fitted. In addition, these criticisms do point to a widening
possibility that fighting men will become increasingly compelled to accept what
Admiral Doenitz characterized as a "code of hardness" which forswore "every
principle of the sea's fellowship-mutual help in the face of nature, instant
assistance to the shipwrecked, magnanimity in victory and fair play at all times.,,3
Linked, as part ofa more-embracing value system with the ethics of the "seas'
fellowship," is the time honored legal notion, in both maritime and land warfare, of
the principle of distinction. Traditionally, war on land distinguished between
civilians and military personnel and between private and public property. At sea, the
merchant ships ofa belligerent were always subject to lawful capture; neutral trading
vessels, unless carrying contraband, were, however, treated as immune. The
extension ofthe concept ofcontraband in World War I and the system ofeconomic
warfare as waged by the United Kingdom and her Allies in both World Wars on
the one side, and, on the other, the indiscriminate raiding strategy of submarine
warfare by Germany, effectively ended that traditional protection of belligerent or
neutral merchant ships, and with it, the principle ofdistinction in maritime warfare.

II. "The Seas' Fellowship"
Historians relating the Batde of Trafalgar tell of the storm that struck the
damaged ships of the victors and vanquished alike. They also record the valiant
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efforts of the victors to save the prize crews, at great risk to themselves and their
prisoners after they had been ordered to abandon their captured ships.4 The
"fellowship of the sea" was also reflected in the capture of enemy private and
merchant ships,5 which, if they submitted to visit and search by a warship, would
not be attacked. Furthermore, crews and passengers were, by their capture,
placed under the protection of their captors or, at least, had so far as conditions
made it possible, the expectation that their safety would be assured. 6
These values were observed, in the main, in both World Wars by the German
surface commerce raiders. An example of the "seas fellowship" was set by Count
von Lucknerin his Seeadlerin World War 1. There were, with some unfortunate
exceptions, similar examples in World War II: the famous Altmark incident arose
from a British naval rescue of 300 British merchant navy officers and seamen
who had been taken prisoner by the German pocket battleship Crqf Spee while
the latter ship was engaging in commerce raiding in the South Atlantic. The
incident became notorious by reason of the fact that the Norwegian authorities,
aware that the Altmark was a naval auxiliary ship, still permitted her to navigate
through approximately 400 miles of Norwegian territorial waters while refusing
a British request to examine her to ascertain whether she was carrying British
seamen who had been taken prisoner. Upon Norway's refusal, the British
destroyer Cossack entered her territorial sea and rescued the British captives?
The relevance of the Altmark incident to this paper is that it illustrates that
German naval authorities acknowledged the authority of, and complied with,
the traditional humanitarian obligations of protecting enemy lives, apart from
the necessary8 infliction of battle casualties (including collateral injuries and
deaths) in sea warfare. In general, one may say that in both World Wars, German
surface raiders did adhere to the traditional values held among seamen. While
the Trial ofHelmuth von Ruchteschelf shows that one German commander of an
armed surface raider failed to live up to those norms of behavior, it also
distinguishes aberrant conduct on the part of one officer and his crew from the
traditional values observed by most sea warriors.
The surface raiders of the two World Wars were also able to follow the
traditional values of seamen because their ships permitted them to do so. They
had adequate space for accommodating captured crew members, could rendezvous with auxiliary vessels for transhipment and eventual incarceration, and they
carried armament which enabled them to engage in fighting. (For example, the
disguised German armed raider Kormoran sank, by recourse to a perhaps obsolete
ruse of war, the Australian cruiser Sydney in November 1941).10 So long as naval
warfare remained two-dimensional, its conduct was largely, if not entirely,
consistent with the traditional values. This was so despite the development of
turbine-driven warships with "ship-killing" armaments. In writing of the
aftermath of the Battle ofHeligoland Bight on August 28, 1914, Keegan pointed
out that:
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"There was time for Keyes [the British Commander] to come alongside one of
the foundering victims, Mainz, and for an echo of Trafalgar to sound across the
. tern.
h
,,11
waters separatIng

III. Three Dimensional Warfare at Sea
The new, twentieth century development of three dimensional naval warfare
has resulted from the increasing use of aircraft and submarines. To the end of
World War II, the fragile hulls of the submarines exposed them to almost
inevitable destruction by ramming, should they offer to fight on the surface.
Their light surface fighting armaments meant they would be outgunned by
armed merchant ships, and their cramped quarters dictated that they could carry
very few, ifany, prisoners. Hence their very design and structure militated against
their observing the traditional norms of the sea.
While it might be argued that rigid airships and zeppelins might develop a
capability for observing the traditional humanitarian values of the sea, the future
did not lie with them but with heavier-than-air craft. Like submarines, these
latter aircraft did not have the structural ability to take and secure prisoners and
rescue wounded seamen.
These still-developing vessels and aircraft, operating in the depths of the seas
and in the air, illustrate how war in three dimensions now challenges the present
body of law, predicated as it is on two dimensional contests. It is necessary,
therefore, to examine the new strategies and tactics in light of the present law,
so far as that can be made relevant, and to determine if still applicable principles
can be extrapolated from the past.

IV. A Retrospective
A. The Anti-Submarine Diplomatic Campaign, 1922-36.
The German use of indiscriminate submarine warfare against Allied and
neutral shipping in World I had threatened the survival of the United Kingdom
as well as the effectiveness of the intervention of the United States. Therefore,
the victorious Entente and Associated Powers, led by Great Britain, engaged in
the inter-war period in a diplomatic campaign to outlaw the use of submarines
as commerce raiders. The Allies "had been severely shaken by the 'First Battle
of the Atlantic,' appalled by its cost and severely stressed by the effort needed to
fight it.,,12 Accordingly, by Article 191 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was
prohibited from engaging in "[t]he construction or acquisition of any submarine,
" 13
even fcor commerCl·al purposes....
Shortly thereafter, at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, Great
Britain failed to obtain agreement on limiting the total tonnage of the parties'
submarine fleets and of the tonnage of the individual boats of which those fleets
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were comprised. 14 While Article 3 of the Treaty15 resulting from that Conference sought to establish the principle that an officer under the orders of a
responsible state who engages in such activities "shall be liable to trial and
punishment as if for an act of piracy," this provision did not enter into force,
and the attempt to stigmatize such an officer as a pirate (rather than merely a war
criminal) was subsequently abandoned. On the other hand, principles such as
those reflected in Article 1 of the Washington Treaty which provided that
submarines were not exempt from the rules applicable to surface warships, were
written into Part IV (Article 22) of the subsequent London Naval Treaty of
1930. 16 This latter treaty, too, had some problems with acceptance (it was not
ratified by France and Italy). France, in particular, argued for a distinction
between the submarine as a legitimate weapon and its inhuman use. She argued
that a belligerent using the weapon in a reprehensible manner should be
condemned, rather than the weapon itsel£
Prior to the London Naval Conference of 1935, which was called to frame
a treaty to replace that of 1930, Great Britain sought the ratification of Part IV
(Article 22) of the 1930 Treaty. That provision was as follows:
The following are accepted as established rules ofIntemational Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the
rules ofIntemational Law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether a surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed passengers, crews and ship's papers in a place of
safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in existing sea and weather
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is
in a position to take them on board.
The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the
above rules. 17

France and Italy deposited their instruments of ratification of Part IV on
November 6, 1936. Subsequently, because of a problem arising from the
non-renewal of the London Naval Treaty18 a number ofstates 19 adhered to the
London Protocol of1936.2o In addition to the original signatories, Mghanistan,
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Nepal, Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and the Soviet Union adhered to
this Protocol.
The upshot ofall the diplomatic activity was that the parties could be deemed
to have recognized that the belligerent rights of submarines attacking merchant
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vessels, despite their obvious limitations and vulnerabilities, should be no greater
than those traditionally exercised by surface warships. Their obligations called
for respect for the safety ofnon-combatants, prohibited the unnecessary destruction of private property, and, further, characterized violations of these rules as
constituting gross breaches of the rules of international law. On the other hand,
the proponents of the stigmatization of submarine personnel engaging in the
indiscriminate sinking, without warning, of merchant ships as pirates jure gentium
abandoned their arguments in that regard. It should also be noted that aircraft,
although subject to physical limitations analogous to submarines, were not
mentioned. To this writer such a lacuna reflects the former Allied Powers' (and
especially Great Britain's) phobia against the use of submarines as commerce
raiders. This stemmed from the traumatic experience of Britain in World War
I when the submarine proved to be the only weapon which threatened her with
disaster. The fact that disaster was narrowly evaded did little to mitigate the
trauma and the insecurity resulting therefrom.

B. The Challenge in the Mediterranean, 1937.
(1) The Problem
In the Spanish Civil War, both sides (including Franco's German and Italian
"sympathizers") sought to employ naval power on the high seas against merchant
shipping supplying their opponents. The insurgent Franco forces had not been
recognized as belligerents. Hence, the conflict was not an international war in
which the contestants enjoyed belligerent rights. Non-participating states therefore took the position that any action by either the government's or the
insurgents' war vessels in interfering with foreign shipping on the high seas was
illegal. Accordingly, foreign powers were entitled to use force to protect their
merchant ships from restraints imposed by the combatants' warships.
During 1937 newspapers carried reports of the sinking without warning of a
number of merchant ships of various flags by bombing from aircraft or by
torpedoes from unidentified submerged submarines. These depredations took
place in the Mediterranean area and were widely believed to be connected with
the Spanish civil war.21 As Professor Finch in an article written at approximately
that time stated:
A number of merchant ships of various nationalities have been bombed by
aeroplanes or attacked by submarines of doubtful identity. All the attacks were
said to have been without warning and regardless of the fate of the passengers and
crews, but fortunately there appears to have been but slight loss of life. Whatever
the identity of the attackers, they were evidently acting in the interest of
the Spanish insurgent forces. The attacks were obviously of great strategic
importance in cutting the flow of supplies from Soviet Russia to the Spanish
Government.... England also became aroused over the danger to her "life line"
through the Mediterranean Sea and demanded protective measures. 22
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These attacks revived demands for the outlawing of this kind of warfare. The
British Government, in particular, wished to have agreement that officers
engaging in such hostilities, even when acting under the orders of their
governments, should be deemed to be pirates. Other states were satisfied with
the view that the conduct of such operations constituted grave breaches of the
rules of war and that officers engaging in such tactics, should be tried and
punished for their acts. 23
(2) The Nyon Arrangements
As a result of the submarine and aircraft attacks in the Mediterranean, several
European states called for an international conference to deal with the problem.
The Conference convened on September 9, 1937, at Nyon, France, and within
five days signed an agreement, known as the Nyon Arrangement. 24
In its preamble, the Nyon Arrangement recited that submarine attacks on
merchant vessels "not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties" had
occurred and, citing Part IV of the Treaty of London,2S it added thereto by
asserting the hitherto unsuccessful British formula that such attacks "shouldjustly
be treated as acts of piracy." The arrangement obligated the participating states
to instruct their naval forces to counter-attack and destroy any submarine which
had attacked a merchant vessel" contrary to the rules ofinternationallaw referred
to" in Part IV of the London Treaty of 1930.26 This instruction was extended,
in the next article, "to any submarine encountered in the vicinity of a position
where a ship not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties has
recently been attacked in violation of the rules referred to in the preceding
paragraph.,,27 In addition, the Nyon Arrangement created an International Naval
Patrol to supplement the efforts ofindividual Mediterranean states.28 Later, as a
result of further submarine attacks on merchant shipping, the limiting requirement in provision III was dispensed with and the governments concerned
(United Kingdom, France and Italy) announced that they would sink "any
submarine found submerged" in the zones of the Mediterranean placed under
the signatories' respective contro1. 29
(3) The Geneva Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement of
September 17, 1937
Despite the diplomatic emphasis on submarines as commerce raiders, submarines did not provide the only means of attacking merchant ships on the high
seas in the Spanish Civil War. Shore based aircraft also attacked shipping in the
Mediterranean. Accordingly, after the conclusion of the Nyon Arrangement,
ten of the states represented at the Conference convened at Geneva and adopted
an "Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Agreement,,30 for the purpose of
protecting merchant ships against surface and air attack.
The September 17 Geneva agreement was made an "integral part,,31 of the
Nyon Arrangement. But there are important differences between the provisions
relating to submarines and those covering aircraft and surface vessels. While the

9

Goldie

Nyon Arrangement provided that submarines seen, or believed to have been
guilty of, torpedoing merchant ships without warning should be attacked and
"if possible destroyed," with regard to aircraft, the protecting ships were called
upon to "open fire" only against planes actually seen to have attacked merchant
ships.32 Should patrolling ships actually see surface warships attacking nonSpanish merchant ships, those patrol ships should only "intervene to resist"
further attack. 33 As Padelford points out:
Patrol vessels were given no mandate by the Supplementary Agreement to
counter-attack aircraft or surface vessels with a view to their complete destruction.
No provision was made for the capture ofany offending craft or their personnel.34
Padelford's contrast between the different situations permitting action by the
patrol vessels, and the sanctions that they might lawfully apply to the three
distinct means of commerce destruction, highlights the concern about submarines and the British drive to treat their captains and crews as pirates. This
special hostility to submarines, appeared to blind the parties to the potential of
aircraft for wreaking havoc on the oceans without also having the capability of
assuring the safety of their victims.
The Nyon and Geneva Agreements reflect, in this writer's view, the high
watermark of the British inter-War campaign to have an international agreement
that stigmatized indiscriminate submarine warfare as "piracy." This apogee was
soon left behind in the evolution of submarine weapons, strategies and tactics
that evolved to answer the belligerents' needs in World War II.

V. World War II and the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal

35

To whatever extent decisions of international tribunals, or of domestic
tribunals applying international law, have credibility, the decisional law regarding the German indiscriminate submarine campaign after World War II has
thrown an ambiguous light on the issue of the acceptance, in practice, of the
1936 London Protocol.

A. An Issue of Discrimination?
First, it should be noted that the United Nations War Crimes Commission
did not address the question of blockade by resort to aerial attacks on shipping.
Aircraft, as has already been indicated, have limitations similar to submarines
regarding their capability to visit, search and seize ships, and ensure the safety of
their crews. Possibly this omission could be explained by the fact that the United
Nations forces themselves engaged in this activity to a greater extent than did
the Axis Powers. Knowing it to be illegal, the United Nations prosecutors may
not have wished to have the conduct of their own military planners stigmatized
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as war crimes. Or, alternatively, they may have planned their cases that way
because they felt that long distance blockades had become lawful through general
practice and acceptance and, further, because such blockades could lawfully be
enforced by aircraft, limited though they were in ensuring the safety of target
ships' passengers, papers, and crews.

B. Judging Submarine Waifare at Nuremberg
The records of the war crimes tribunals regarding prosecutions for indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships by submarines are instructive. The interWar diplomatic campaigns to stigmatize unrestricted submarine warfare as piracy
were not resumed. That particular cause seemed as extinct now as the dinosaurs.
Although Admirals Doenitz and Raeder were charged before the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with waging unrestricted submarine warfare
contrary to the London Naval Treaty of1930 and the 1936 Naval Protocol (to
which Hitler's Germany had acceded), and although charges were brought that
on or about September 3, 1939,36 the German U-boat arm began unrestricted
submarine warfare, the Tribunal was not prepared to find Doenitz guilty for his
conduct of that form ofsubmarine warfare against British armed merchant ships.
Perhaps this reluctance arose after the Tribunal received evidence of unrestricted
submarine warfare in a maritime prohibited zone which the United Kingdom
had established in the Skagerrak on May 8, 1940, and Admiral Nimitz's answers
to interrogatories which established that the United States Navy had engaged in
unrestricted submarine warfare against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean from
the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor until the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay.
The Tribunal announced that the sentencing ofDoenitz was not assessed on the
ground of his "breaches of the international law of submarine warfare. ,,37
On the other hand, it should be noted that some brutal submarine attacks on
civilian shipping in both World Wars were punished as war crimes. But these
always involved conduct that was more reprehensible than merely the act of
sinking the victim ship without warning and without giving its crew an
opportunity to seek relative safety. The war crimes cases arising from both World
Wars that stand out illustrate the minority situations in which the accused
resorted to intensified inhumanity. These included:
1. The llandovery Castle (World War 1)38. In this case the submerged U-boat
82 sank a hospital ship which was distinctly marked as such. The hospital ship
was not carrying any military personnel other than sick and wounded soldiers
and members of the Canadian Medical Corps. After torpedoeing the hospital
ship the submarine's commander, Patzig, ordered the U-boat to surface and,
after questioning some of the survivors, fired on them in lifeboats, massacring
many of them. After the War, Patzig was not found, but two of his officers were
arrested, tried and convicted of their war crimes. Their pleas of following
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superior orders were rejected since "killing defenseless people in life-boats could
be nothing else than a breach of the law".39
2. The Peleus (World War II). A submarine commander ordered the massacre
by machine-gun fire of the survivors who were clinging to pieces of wreckage
from the sunken merchant ship.40
3. Trial if Karl-Heinz Moehle (World War II): As in The Peleus, the accused
had ordered the massacre ofsurvivors of sunken ships and was convicted for that
aggravated offense. 41
4. Trial if Helmuth von Ruchteschell (World War 11)42: The accused was the
commander of an armed German surface raider. He was charged with committing, inter alia, the following offenses against Allied merchant ships: (a) continuing
to fire after the target ship had signalled her surrender; (b) failure to make
provision for the safety of survivors (despite having the facilities for taking
prisoners on board his ship); and (c) firing at survivors in life rafts. 43
In all the above cases the officers charged were guilty of conduct that involved
gratuitous and deliberate acts of brutality which went beyond just the sinking of
the victims' ships without warning and, without more, leaving their crews to
whatever fate the sea might have in store for them. Although some of the accused
were called upon to answer before the IMT, their offenses are inherently
distinguishable from those for which Admirals Doenitz and Raeder went
unpunished in that they involved gratuitous cruelty not even justifiable in terms
of collateral damage.

VI. A "Dip into the Future..44

1"

In his book, The Price Admiralty,John Keegan provides masterly descriltions
of the Battle ofMidway4 and the Battle of the Atlantic ofWorld War 11. 4 After
a carefully reasoned comparison of air power and the effectiveness of the true
submarine, namely the nuclear powered boat (which he designates as "the
ultimate capital ship,,47) he determined, in his luminous chapter entitled "Conclusion: An Empty Ocean, ,,48 that:
In a future war the oceans might appear empty again, swept clear both of merchant
traffic and of the navies which have sought so long to protect it against predators.
Yet the oceans' emptiness will be illusory, for in their deeps new navies of
submarine warships, great and small, will be exacting from each other the price
of admiralty.49
Insightful as these closing sentences are, one may have a sense that they are
predicated on a notion of the use of force at sea which has escalated into total,
indeed totalitarian, war. 50 It assumes a desperate diversion of national resources
involving the total effort of a wealthy, highly developed country into complex
submarine fighting and logistical systems. Imagine, for example, the magnitude
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and the cost of supplying, in times of war, such countries as Britain or Japan by
a submarine merchant service whose convoys, would have to be protected by
further investments in armed submarine escorts of many sizes deploying a
diversity of weapons systems. A similar investment might well be necessary to
provide logistical support for United States combat forces serving in battle, for
example, in Europe, Australia and Oceania, South America or on some part of
the Asian mainland.
This other glimpse of the future is surely predicated upon a world embroiled
in a type of total war whose ruthlessness would render the maritime contests in
World War II relatively temperate by comparison. Service in the depths of the
ocean, whether mercantile or combat, would leave no place at all for "the sea's
fellowship." Every vessel could become an inescapable coffin for all who sailed
in her. 51
Short of such a desperate sacrifice of human and economic resources, limited
three dimensional wars may well be fought on the"SUrface of the seas, in the
deeps and in the air--with ancillary activities in outer space. Perhaps one may
argue that, because of the challenges ofsuch a total war asJohn Keegan envisions,
whatever resort to force may occur may well be self-limiting or limited by a
refusal to commit additional resources, or finally limited from outside by
international groups or alliances acting in the enlightened self-interest of the
generality of mankind.
Be that as it may, in the quite recent past, several wars involving fighting at
sea, namely the India-Pakistan War (1971), the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict
(1982) and the Persian Gulf Tanker War (1982-88) illustrate that limitations do
occur. In the India-Pakistan conflict there was very little interest from the point
of view of maritime warfare law except for the short-lived blockade (or rather
proclamation of a blockade) of Pakistani ports which O'Connell viewed as "so
aberrant in its purposes and enforcement as to offer scant lessons ... 52 As
O'Connell points out, there was "no investment of Pakistan ports, nor even
visitation on the high seas, but neutral ships were attacked en route to Pakistan ... 53

A. The Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, 1982
In two of the conflicts mentioned above, namely the Falkland Islands Conflict
(1982)54 and the Persian Gulf Tanker War (1982-1988),55 the contests were
limited as to space, and to some extent, weapons. But the limitations worked
out in very different ways. In the 1982 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Conflict a
number of exclusion zones were proclaimed (seven in all). These seemed, in
general, to be guided by a felt need on the part of both parties to the war to
establish an arena, or a ring, inside of which, apart from the need of the British
fleet to protect itself as it approached the battle zone, the struggle was largely
contained. The British declarations and the first two Argentinean zones reflected
the desire of both sides to limit the conflict to the Islands and to the seas around
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them. The British resort to maritime exclusion zones was to further their strategy
of retaking and defending the Islands. Their strategy was, in part, executed by
raiding combat tactics conducted within the various exclusion zones. On the
other hand, the Argentinean invocation ofsuch zones (except her third, her May
11, 1982, proclamation of a "South Atlantic War Zone,,)56 was for the purpose
of reinforcing her persisting holding tactics once her raiding strategy had netted
her control over the disputed islands. This appeared to be a corollary to the claim
that each of the parties asserted that it was merely exercising its right of
self-defense, and was limiting its use of force to expelling its adversary from the
islands it claimed, or to prevent that adversary from permanently establishing a
possessory authority over them.
The British first announced a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), on April 9,
1982, to take effect on April 12, 1982. The prohibited zone was the area enclosed
by a two-hundred-nautical-mile radius drawn from a point approximately at the
center of the Falkland Islands. Under this promulgation only Argentine warships
and naval auxiliaries found within this zone were liable to be attacked. 57 On the
following day Argentina responded by establishing a two hundred mile zone off
its coast and around the "Malvinas" (Falkland) Islands. Since the approaching
British fleet was still some distance from the Islands, the declaration of the British
Maritime Exclusion Zone had the effect, as a ruse of war, of reinforcing an
unfounded Argentine belief that the Royal Naval nuclear submarine HMS
Superb was on station in the area of Puerto Belgrano and the Falklands. The fact
that HMS Superb was at Holy Loch, Scotland, at the time may give rise to the
question whether the British "blockade" complied with the Declaration of
Paris.58 On this point Professor Levie has commented:
The British declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral
vessels were not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy naval
vessels. It was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to Argentine
naval vessels. 59

On April 23, 1982, the United Kingdom Government informed the Argentine
Government that:
... any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval
auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the
mission of the British forces in the South Adantic, will encounter the appropriate
response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of
these British forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with
accordingly.6O

In essence, this declaration created a moving "Defensive Bubble" around the
British forces deploying to the South Atlantic.
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On April 28, 1982 the British Government announced its Total Exclusion
Zone (TEZ), to take effect on April 30, 1982.61 While occupying the same area
as the MEZ of April 12, this zone also encompassed "any aircraft, whether
military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation [of the
Falkland Islands by Argentine forces].,,62 It continued with the further warning
that:
Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within this
zone without due authority fonn the Ministry of Defence in London will be
regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be
regarded as hostile ...63
When on May 2 the British submarine Conqueror torpedoed and sank the
Argentine cruiser General Belgrano some 30 miles outside the April 12 and 28
zone, the British Government experienced criticism for apparently violating its
own self-imposed geographical limits to the conflict, it justified the attack on
basis of the April 23 ("Defensive Bubble") declaration rather than the MEZ and
TEZ declarations. As stated by Minister of Defense Nott in Parliament:
That zone [i.e., the TEZ proclaimed on April 28, 1982] was not relevant in this
case. The General Belgrano was attacked under the terms of our warning to the
Argentines some ten days previously that any Argentine naval vessel or military
aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British
forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. 64
Finally, it should be noted that in all her announcements of the delimitations
of her specific zones, Great Britain still continued to insist that it was without
prejudice to her general right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. Criticism of the Belgrano attack may be further seen as
paradoxical since at the time of the sinking, the Argentine forces were occupying
the Islands and the British forces were forcibly attempting to terminate that
possession.
The United Kingdom's Ministry ofDefense announced on May 7, 1982, that
because hostile forces "can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad
weather,,,65 the distances involved in resupplying the Argentine forces on the
Falkland Islands, or taking other hostile action, any"Argentine warship or aircraft
found more than twelve miles from the Argentine coast" will be treated as
hostile. 66 The Soviet Union, without protesting against the creation of an
exclusion zone in principle, advised the British Government that it considered
the latest statement of policy unlawful "because it 'arbitrarily proclaim[ed] vast
expanses of the high seas closed to ships and craft of other countries. ",67 On this
Professor Levie has commented:
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Of course, a blockade always denies the use of part of the high seas to other
countries. While the Soviet Union might have questioned the extent of the
blockaded area as excessive, if the blockade was effective (and there seems little
doubt that it was), it was a valid blockade under the 1856 Declaration of Paris, to
which Russia was one of the original parties.68

An analogous criticism of this Soviet protest is that there Was an adequate
ratio of force to space and time for the purpose of carrying out the enforcement
of the British maritime exclusion zones. Furthermore, the proclamation appeared to have been enforced by persistent holding, rather than raiding,
tactics-a further consideration in its favor. Finally, in the sense that this
proclamation, like its predecessors, was seeking to limit the area of hostilities, it
exhibited a wise resort to economy offorce as well as a desire not to unleash the
horrors of war in an indiscriminate manner.
After the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands had surrendered, Great
Britain lifted the Total Exclusion Zone on July 22, 1982, but, at the same time,
asked the Argentine Government (via the Swiss Government) not to allow its
military aircraft or warships within a zone measuring 150 sea miles radius around
the Falkland Islands. Similarly Argentina was warned not to allow her civil
aircraft and shipping within that zone without the prior agreement of the British
Government.
In response to the British MEZ on April 8, 1982, Argentina proclaimed a
similar Maritime Zone, and, on April 29 , 1982, it strengthened its MEZ. Finally
it proclaimed, on May 11, 1982, a "South Atlantic War Zone." This last
declaration has been the occasion of well-known United States domestic
litigation. In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Repub/ic69 the plaintiff
corporation sued Argentina for the loss of its very large oil tanker Hercules as a
result of three successive air strikes by Argentine aircraft using bombs and
air-to-surface missiles. At the time of the attack the Hercules was about 600
miles off the Argentine coast and nearly 500 miles from the Falkland Islands?O
The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that she was:
[I]n international waters, well outside the "exclusion zones" declared by the
•
•
71
wamng parties.

While this statement would have been true if it had referred to the British
zones and those declared by Argentina on April 8 and April 29, 1982, it was of
doubtful accuracy with regard to Argentina's "South Atlantic War Zone" which
that country declared on May 11, 1982. It is a valid inference, therefore, that
the court may have been prepared to recognize Argentina's first two declarations
as creating valid exclusion zones, but it was not prepared to extend that
recognition to the vaguely defined "South Atlantic War Zone.,,72 Indeed, this
last zone, regardless of the bombing of the Hercules, fails the tests of
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reasonableness, proportionality, clarity of definition and self-defense. It clearly
failed to provide for an adequate ratio ofpower to space and time, and amounted
to little more than an excuse for conducting indiscriminate attacks on neutral
shipping, rather than fonnulating an effective logistical persisting, holding
strategy, which could be integrated in a sea-keeping assertion of naval power
utilized for rational ends. This last proclamation, and the unhappy event
following from it, did nothing to assist Argentina in her attempt to establish
possession of the islands she claimed. By extending the scope of the contest to
include an unoffending neutral merchant ship that clearly could not have been
carrying war supplies to the British forces, and by expanding the area of her war
zone, Argentina could have risked the possibility (improbable as it was under
the concrete circumstances of the situation) of escalation, both as to parties and
area.

B. The Persian Gulf "Tanker War" 1982-1988-A Contrast
The Iraq-Iran war began with the border clashes inJune-August 1980, leading
to full scale land fighting on September 21, 1980.13 The Persian Gulf Tanker
War may be said to have begun with the Iraqi declaration on August 12, 1982
of a prohibited war zone at the northern end of the Persian Gulf (north of 29°
03' North).14 In contrast with the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, which took
place in an unfrequented and secluded part of the world, the Persian (or Arabian)
Gulf War was fought in one of the world's busiest waterways. The original Iraqi
prohibited war zone essentially contained the northern end of the GuI£ In reality,
however, this zone was not so much one of exclusion, supported by a persisting
logistical strategy, as the proclamation of an intention to engage in random air
raids having the object of inhibiting Iranian shipping in the GuI£ Subsequendy,
the zone's perimeters were enlarged to include the key Iranian oil installations
on Kharg Island. In February 1984, the zone was expanded to include the area
within a 50-mile radius around Kharg.
Until early in 1984 the Iraqis concentrated their attacks on ships navigating
in the northern zone and sailing to and from Bandar Khomeini and Bandar
Manshar. But after early 1984 they concentrated their air strikes on ships sailing
to and from Kharg. The Iraqi logistical strategy was clear. Like Napoleon's Berlin
and Milan decrees against Great Britain (which were directed against British
trade and that country's ability to wage war and subsidize her allies from her
income from that trade), the object of the raids was to deny Iran income she
needed from oil exports in order to purchase war material abroad and, generally,
defray her costs of waging the war.
Iran had a similar logistical end in view, namely that of suppressing her
enemy's trade with third countries which had enabled Iraq and other Gulf
countries that were subsidizing Iraq's war effort to earn the money needed to
defray Iraq's cost of waging the war. Unlike Napoleon's policy, which sought
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an unlimited geographical scope (and was limited only by his lack ofsea power)75
this prevention of trade was executed by seeking to interdict all and any
navigation to and from Iraqi ports in the Gul£ But Iraq was able to export her
oil, and so defray the costs of her belligerency, by pipelines across her western
and southern neighbors.
In addition to the foregoing, Iran also established prohibited zones off the
shores ofIraq's supporters in the war. For example, this was done to Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates in the hope of reducing their oil revenues and hence
their contributions to Iraq's war effort. Responses to Iranian attacks launched in
support ofthis policy included the United States policy ofreflagging of Kuwait's
tankers, establishing convoys with United States, British, French and Italian
escorts, and bringing the issue of the unlawful interference with neutral flag
shipping to the Security Council of the United Nations. All these steps did not
prevent continued Iranian raids on neutral flag tankers. Nor, indeed, did the
Saudi Arabian proclamation of a 12-mile safety corridor which, since it was
within the territorial seas of the seven states of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
was entitled to belligerent respect and was intended to provide security for
neutral shipping--especially the very large tankers carrying oil from Kuwait and
from other supporters ofIraq. Be that as it may, the parties' motives for resorting
to proclaiming their prohibited or war zones were not for the purpose ofsetting
geographical limits to the fighting. Rather, their zones were used offensively,
and the only limits imposed on the geographical extent of the fighting were the
physical limitations of the parties' weapons and platforms. Neither party set any
limits as to the states whose flags they were likely to attack.

C. A Brief Reprise and Review
The thesis of the present paper includes an argument that the starkness of
modem three dimensional maritime contention may, except in the most
desperate, circumstances where escalation may prove especially difficult to
control, impose limits to the contest. While the contestants themselves may see
their self-interest in limiting fighting both geographically and as to parties,
neutrals will have an even stronger motive to "keep the ring." One device that
has been used in order to set geographical limits to a contest is the use, by the
contestants themselves, ofwar or exclusion zones. This, it is suggested, is a novel
employment of an old and familiar, if controversial, device. The Falklands,
(Malvinas) Conflict provides a recent example. By contrast, the Persian Gulf
Tanker War does not give any evidence of a similar exercise of self-restraint, by
either party. The restraints that did exist, such as they were, were imposed by
the economic limitations of the parties, and by the relatively limited range of
weapons and means and methods of fighting at their disposal.
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VII. "Starvation Blockade"
The long distance blockades against Gennany and her allies in both World
Wars have been stigmatized by a number ofwriters as "starvation blockades" by
reason of the inclusion of fuels, forage and foodstuffi in the categories of
conditional contraband and the shift of many consumer goods from conditional
to absolute contraband such that the distinction between the two forms became
eroded?6 Indeed, as a result of that erosion and as the list of contraband goods
has so dramatically been extended, the principle of distinction has ceased to have
utility. As Professor Tucker tells us:
[O]ccasionally the argument has been pressed that a belligerent in endeavoring to
seize all goods destined to an enemy state, including goods intended for consumption by the civilian population, thereby violates the principle requiring a distinc77
tion to be drawn between the treatment of combatants and non-combatants.

Professor Tucker does not agree with this charge. His response distinguishes
between direct attacks against civilians and situations where civilians, in cases of
blockade, may collaterally suffer from the effects of war along with the combatants?8 Of course, the case of neutrals is quite distinct. Added to the
uncertainty of the law in principle is the difficulty comprised in the indeterminacy of the criterion of "ultimate enemy destination." This problem was
finessed by the British by means of their "rationing" of neutrals and their
"navicert" systems,79 and by "blacklisting" merchants who traded with Gennany
and the European Axis Powers generally in World War II. 80 The net effect of
this fonn of economic warfare was, in World War I, to leave a relatively meager
supply of foodstuffi and raw materials for the internal consumption of the
populations of the states that neighbored Gennany. Without such restrictions,
those neighbors could have served as transit points to meet all of Gennany's
needs. This neutral commerce, moreover, would quite clearly have been
conducted at very favorable prices. It was such reasons as these that induced the
Entente Powers to refuse to ratify the Declaration of London of1909,81 despite
their original inclination to favor it. They found, on analysis, that Gennany and
Austria could receive foodstuffi by transhipment through the neutral state of the
Netherlands via the Rhine River, since the Netherlands Government took the
position that her declaration of neutrality and her participation in the Convention of Mannheim regulating the navigation of the Rhine prevented her from
stopping such trade. 82 The advantages to the neutral states of the navicert system
and the policy of "rationing" was the avoidance oflosses through delays at the
belligerents' contraband control centers.
The Central Powers In World War I and the Axis Powers in World War II
also sought to bring England to her knees by the logistical strategy of unrestricted
submarine warfare. This strategy was unsuccessful because to be effective it
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required a holding strategy - a capability of holding the" chokepoints" in which
the interdiction of ships and cargoes would be completely successful.
The two World Wars were total or "totalitarian" wars. They came to involve
almost all the Powers and all, or almost all, of their populations and resources so
that each of them strained every resource to ensure victory. As the contest
increased in intensity, resort was made to additional and more ruthless means
and methods of fighting as the conflict escalated. Hence the starvation blockades
by both sides were justified by each as reprisals for wrongdoing by their adversary.
But an analysis that placed reliance on reprisals, per se, as the rationale for the
escalation in the "hardness" displayed by each side, overlooks the stark realities
of those wars. For each side, the war was, in a very real sense, "to the death,"
and because more and more of each nation's resources were sucked into the
fight, the escalation became a function of each side's desperation. Reprisals were
merely a justification for both sides' next step into the abyss of totalitarian war.
They were simply legal masks for improving the image of the party resorting to
them and for denigrating his opponent. But these escalations were almost
independent of moral and legal considerations, despite the commitment of one
side to the restoration of international legality and morality as a "war aim."
Article 54, paragraph 1, of Protocol I, provides: "[s]tarvation of civilians as a
method of warfare is prohibited."s3 In his comments on this article Dr. Elmar
Rauch states that the "arguments put forth by Prime Minister Churchill in the
British Parliament would be no longer tenable."s4 This writer doubts whether
Dr. Rauch's position is tenable, given the modalities and conditional phrases and
implications in the remaining four paragraphs of article 54. To pursue such an
analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Rather the thought here
offered is that, in the event of totalitarian war involving the greater part of this
planet, modes of fighting will escalate so that the "hardness" advocated by
Admiral Doenitz will prevail. The justification of such an escalation may well
be, for both sides, appeals to reprisals as responses to their adversaries' alleged
previous illegal conduct. In such a situation, John Keegan's version of a silent,
and lethal underwater contest could become a reality. The sightlessness of such
a form of battle would leave civilian populations ashore at the mercy of whatever
supplies the underwater barge-trains ofcargo carriers could bring past an enemy's
interdiction forces.
In fighting on a more limited scale, however, or where enforcement measures
may be resorted to under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it would
appear unlikely that anything approaching the type of starvation blockade that
both sides resorted to in World Wars I and II, and was envisaged in paragraph
I of Protocol I's Article 54, would eventuate.
With regard to resort to submarine warfare in such conflicts, Professor
Mallison, for example, has observed that "although submarines are de jure entitled
to combat:mt status, they are not extensively employed in limited war."ss On
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the other hand the British bluff, with regard to the nuclear submarine Superb86
and that country's effective use ofH.M.S. Conqueror,87 in the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict should not be overlooked. But, it should be pointed out, that
country did not use her submarine service for raiding logistical activities, let alone
"indiscriminate sinking on sight" policies.

VIII. Conclusion
The foregoing brief and impressionistic review has, perhaps too pessimistically, seen in the means and methods that are available today an increasing stress
on the "killing" of ships, aircraft and underwater vessels, rather than on "man
killing"-leaving the weapons and platforms damaged but not totally
destroyed. 88 With the increase of "ship killing" capabilities, the possibilities, as
well as the opportunities, of rescue tend to become diminished to a vanishing
point. Thus Doenitz's "code of hardness" has become technologically inevitable.
But the enormous investment in fighting wars with the technological monsters
that increasingly eliminate the human equation may leave situations where states
resorting to the use of force may prudentially hold back from escalating their
contest until it reaches such a level of inhumanity.
In limited contests the traditional norms of rescue, respect for hospital,
medical and cartel ships, coastal fishing and marketing boats and vessels guaranteed safe conduct, can and may well survive. But it should be pointed out that
limited contests at sea can be of two kinds: where the parties voluntarily limit
their goals; and where the means, methods and resources of the combatants are
limited. In the former situation, as, for example, in the case of the Falklands
(Malvinas) Conflict, the rules of war were punctiliously observed. Professor
Levie stressed this point when he characterized that contest as a "gentlemen's
war. ,,89 In such wars, "starvation blockades" do not provide useful weapons and,
as in the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, tend not to be resorted to. Yet, in wars
where the contestants are limited only by their resources, they most probably
would only be governed by feasibility, the probability of success, and fear of
reciprocity. Indeed, while minor contests may give rise to "gentlemanly"
fighting,90 or, alternatively, escalate into violent and bloody confrontations, it is
highly probable that in totalitarian wars waged at the cutting edge of human
beings' technological capabilities, Keegan's comment that " ... the suspicion
grows that battle has already abolished itself,,,91 may well tum out to be true.
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